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Complementarity and Demand Theory:  
From the 1920s to the 1940s
Jean-Sébastien Lenfant
The history of consumer demand is often presented as the history of the 
transformation of the simple Marshallian device into a powerful Hick-
sian representation of demand. Once upon a time, it is said, the Marshal-
lian “law of demand” encountered the principle of ordinalism and was 
progressively transformed by it into a beautiful theory of demand with 
all the attributes of modern science. The story may be recounted in many 
different ways, introducing small variants and a comparative complex-
ity. And in a sense that story would certainly capture much of what hap-
pened. But a scholar may also have legitimate reservations about it, 
because it takes for granted that all the protagonists agreed on the mean-
ing of such a thing as ordinalism—and accordingly that they shared the 
same view as to what demand theory should be. On the contrary, it may 
well be more accurate to think that ordinalism was as much a product of 
the story as it was a principle leading the intellectual change.
Thus it may be useful to hypothesize that what happened to the theory 
of the rational consumer and to demand theory in the first half of the 
twentieth century is the consequence of a rising interest attached to the 
idea of choice among alternatives. Consequently, it might be more accu-
rate to think that demand theory and ordinalism went hand in hand at 
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least until the late 1930s. This story may be traced back to F. Y. Edge-
worth, Vilfredo Pareto, and Irving Fisher, who introduced indifference 
curves into the microeconomics of consumption and exchange. Intro-
ducing choice into microeconomic theory opened the door to new ques-
tions and to the need for new tools of analysis as well as to a profound 
transformation of the representation of the psychological foundations of 
choice and demand theories. It led eventually to the now-standard theory 
of the consumer, after John R. Hicks’s and Eugen Slutsky’s contributions. 
The new Hicksian theory of demand that was “stabilized” in the 1940s 
was the result of debates on many related issues: What kinds of tools were 
needed to study demand and choice? What methodological principles 
should be adopted for this? Is choice to be rationalized by some kind of 
psychological explanation? Is rationality worth testing?
Some light may be shed on the transformations of demand analysis in 
the 1930s by telling the story of one of the period’s most debated con-
cepts: complementarity. What is the meaning of such sentences as “x 
and y are substitutes,” “y and z are complementary goods,” or “x and z 
are independent”? If x is a substitute for y, will y necessarily be a substi-
tute for x? Is it supposed to have any empirical counterpart? What kind 
of meaning does it have in the first place?1 All those questions emerged 
soon after the marginalist revolution and were given prominence in the 
1930s. They were at the center of the reshaping of demand theory, toward 
the now-classic Hicks-Slutsky presentation of demand theory.
The purpose of the present article is to focus on how economists 
debated the need for a “good” concept of complementarity and how they 
eventually adopted a definition that fit the needs of both econometric 
modeling and a theory of market interdependencies. Indeed, the reshap-
ing of demand theory in the thirties was stimulated by statistical studies 
of demand, and econometrics played a prominent role in stabilizing neo-
classical demand theory in the early forties.
The first section summarizes the history of complementarity up to 
Slutsky and gives an overview of the theoretical and methodological con-
text of the 1920s that fostered a renewed interest in the concept of comple-
mentarity. The second section captures the ins and outs of Hicks and Roy 
Allen’s 1934 reconstruction of demand and complementarity. The third 
section deals with parallel developments on the concept of related goods 
50 History of Political Economy 38:5 (2006)
1. Of course, it is clear from those questions that complementarity is used here as a generic 
word to represent the relations between goods.
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that were conducted by Harold Hotelling and Henry Schultz in the early 
thirties and provides a narrative about stabilizing demand theory in the 
late thirties through Hicks’s synthesis.
1. A Renewed Interest in Complementarity
Complementarity has been a subject of interest in the context of the mar-
ginalist revolution with the development of a Paretian theory of choice. 
It was then largely ignored under Marshallian dominance and was to be 
rehabilitated as an important question through the development of early 
econometrics in the 1920s. In this section, I briefly narrate how the con-
cept was first developed at the turn of the twentieth century and how it 
became anew a subject of interest.2
Complementarity before the 1920s
The first commonly accepted definition of completing and competing 
goods was proposed by Rudolf Auspitz and Richard Lieben ([1889] 
1914) and was later adopted by Edgeworth, Pareto, and Fisher. It was so 
quickly adopted because it was a quite natural way to interpret the cross 
second-order derivative of the utility function. The ALEP definition 
(from Auspitz, Lieben, Edgeworth, and Pareto) did not emerge as the 
result of long reflection but rather as a word given to an introspectively 
felt relation between goods: the analytic expression ∂2u(.)/∂x∂y preceded 
the definition.3
From William Stanley Jevons [1871] 1965 onward, it would certainly be 
difficult to find a writer interested in price and demand theory who does 
not devote some pages to the notions of substitutes and complements. The 
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2. For a wider and more detailed study, see Lenfant 2003. Some other aspects of the story 
have been studied in Chipman and Lenfant 2002. 
3. This definition was introduced in a discussion of the shape of a so-called pleasure func-
tion (Lebensgenusskurve). While studying the sign of this function, Auspitz and Lieben had 
to cope with the second derivative of another function f(x1, x1(x1),…,xn(x1)), and thus dis-
cussed the sign of a sum of terms 
∂2f(·) ∂xi———  ——.
∂xi∂x1 ∂x1
On this occasion, Auspitz and Lieben introduced their famous criterion of complementarity. 
The cross second-order derivatives (∂2f(·)/∂x1∂xi )i ≥ 2 will be positive, zero, or negative 
“depending on whether (xi) is a complement to the enjoyment of (x1), is totally indifferent to 
(x1), or is competing to it”(Auspitz and Lieben [1889] 1914, 319).
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first approach to the definition of complementarity is based on utility—and 
there every economist accepts the ALEP criterion. A second approach—
pacifically cohabitating with the first one—is built on preferences and 
indifference curves. Both approaches aim at improving demand theory. 
Thus complementarity has been linked with demand analysis from the 
outset, especially with the study of related demand.4 It was commonly 
accepted that a price rise would eventually diminish the consumption of 
complementary goods. The ALEP criterion led one to question this intu-
itive statement, and Auspitz and Lieben ([1889] 1914, 98) were the first 
to mention—without any formal proof, however—that the properties of 
utility could disturb this law of related demand:
It is nevertheless possible that some opposite manifestations may occur, 
because of the many cross-linked influences between goods. Thus, a 
rise in the consumption of coffee will always result in an increase in the 
quantity of sugar used to sweeten it, but, if the same individual is also 
reducing his consumption of tea in consequence of an increased use for 
coffee, it may happen that, instead of increasing, its total consumption 
of sugar should diminish.
A next step in the history of complementarity is Pareto’s Manual of 
Political Economy (in the fourth chapter, “Tastes”). Here Pareto under-
takes a thorough analysis of utility, preferences, and tastes and tackles 
the subject of substitutes and complements in consumption. This study 
dramatically changes the meaning of complementarity for value theory. 
With Pareto, complementarity becomes a concept for the theory of choice. 
As did Fisher, Pareto ([1909] 1971, 182, sec. 8) deals with complementa-
rity when introducing a generalized utility function, and he adopts Auspitz 
and Lieben’s analytic definition (Pareto [1909] 1971, appendix, sec. 46, 
equations 63, 64). Pareto’s discussion reveals that he did not think that 
the concept of complementarity exhausted all the introspective and men-
tal states of the mind for the description of choice situations, and that it 
should better be used as a first approximation, an imperfect analytic rep-
resentation of our states of minds as consumers.
52 History of Political Economy 38:5 (2006)
4. But it would be misleading to believe that it has always been the sole or even the main 
reason for developing the concept of complementarity. Alfred Marshall [1890] 1898, Auspitz 
and Lieben [1889] 1914, and Fisher [1892] 1961 will make special uses of the concept (in 
explaining the properties of the price system or in justifying a measure for consumer surplus). 
Moreover, as regards demand theory properly, complementarity appeared both in the study of 
related demands and in the study of the law of demand.
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It is well known that both Fisher and Pareto were reluctant to accept 
psychological arguments in economics (although maybe not to the same 
extent). This meant, in the first place, to break with the traditional refer-
ence to utility as a measuring rod for pain and pleasure and, more broadly, 
to break with the search for ultimate causes (Fisher [1892] 1961, 5; Pareto 
[1909] 1971, 160). For that reason, both of them engaged in another dis-
cussion about complementarity, on the basis of indifference curves. To that 
extent, their work is more representative of a preference-based approach to 
complementarity.5 For all that, the preference-based approach is not pre-
sented as breaking away from the utility-based approach but rather as 
another way to look at demand behavior.
Fisher’s typology is well known. In his Investigations, he endeavored 
to match the preference-based definition—a general typology built on 
different shapes of indifference curves—and properties of the price sys-
tem.6 Following on this line of thought, Pareto inaugurated a far more 
sophisticated analysis of complementarity.7 He went beyond merely dis-
cussing the shape of indifference curves to describe the properties of the 
indifference map. Through this analysis, Pareto sought to explain the 
occurrence of increasing demand. Thus his main contribution was to 
shift the analysis of complementarity by giving up the study of the shape 
of single indifference curves and focusing instead on the shape of indif-
ference maps. Simultaneously, Pareto shifted from the analysis of related 
demand to the analysis of the law of demand.
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5. Compare the presentation in the full text of the Manual with the one in the appendix 
(secs. 44–51).
6. This approach is based on the idea that, within a two-good framework, complementar-
ity relations can be made apparent and classified through a study of the curvature of indiffer-
ence curves. Actually, Fisher does not develop this idea or any tools for differentiating substi-
tutes and complements. The point is rather that Fisher is not interested in complementarity in 
itself; his idea is to create a continuous geometrical typology and to implement this represen-
tation in price theory. To that extent, Fisher makes a rather straight instrumental use of the 
concept, and he does not even pretend to discuss his own typology in relation with the ALEP 
criterion. He simply uses it to illustrate some statements about the properties of the price 
system: “The essential quality of substitutes or competing articles is that the marginal utili-
ties or the prices of the quantities actually produced and consumed tend to maintain a con-
stant ratio. We may define perfect substitutes as such that this ratio is absolutely constant. 
The essential attribute of completing articles is that the ratio of the quantities actually pro-
duced and consumed tends to be constant (as many shoe-strings as shoes for instance, irre-
spective of cost). We may define perfect completing articles as such that this ratio is abso-
lutely constant” (Fisher [1892] 1961, 66; emphasis in original). 
7. That Pareto investigates both the utility-based and the preference-based approach to 
complementarity accords with his ecumenical methodology. The choice of one method over 
the other is a question of convenience and circumstances.
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To put it briefly, it is well known that Pareto came most of the way in 
deriving the Slutsky equation in the October 1893 issue of the Giornale 
degli economisti (Chipman 1976; Dooley 1983; Weber 1999). In theoriz-
ing about demand, Pareto gave the era’s most general expression on the 
effect of a price change on the demand for a good. As a comment to this 
expression (equation 75 in Pareto [1909] 1971, 423), Pareto underlined the 
possible implications of ALEP complementarity, but he also remarked 
that this criterion cannot by itself serve as a basis for the law of demand, 
except in the case of complementary or independent goods: “For goods 
having a dependence of the second type [ALEP substitutes], when the 
price rises, the demand may increase and then decrease” (197–98). Accord-
ing to this lack of empirical implications of complementarity, Pareto shows 
that it is not easy to develop a solid basis for demand theory without 
having recourse to something other than complementarity in the ALEP 
sense (199).
In sum, Pareto’s contribution to demand theory is inseparable from 
his reflection on complementarity. On the one hand, he lays down the 
empirical implications of the ALEP criterion; on the other, he tackles 
semantic aspects of the concept, in particular in relation with the ALEP 
criterion. One is even led to the result that the search for a new definition 
of substitutes and complements (following the preference-based approach) 
did not originate in any desire to give up the cardinalist criterion but 
was motivated by the search for a more precise and powerful theory of 
demand.
William Johnson (1913) was the first to provide an ordinal definition 
of complementarity on the basis of the derivatives of the marginal rate of 
substitution (although he does not use the name) and to show that this 
definition cannot easily be compared with the traditional ALEP crite-
rion.8 Johnson’s systematic recasting of the concept leads to integrating 
the utility-based approach within the preference-based approach. In this 
respect, his typology of complements and substitutes is even more dedi-
cated toward laying the foundations for a new theory of demand.
The final step in this early story of complementarity is Slutsky’s 1915 
contribution. It is rather difficult to classify. Slutsky does not elaborate on 
the preference-based approach, and to that extent he is not developing the 
Fisher-Pareto-Johnson line of thought. Instead, he focuses exclusively on 
the relationships between the ALEP criterion and demand behavior.
54 History of Political Economy 38:5 (2006)
8. See Schultz 1938, Stigler [1950] 1965, Samuelson 1974, Newman 1987.
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Slutsky’s famous equation—the first analytic decomposition between 
income and substitution effects—gives the variation in the demand of a 
good in reaction to a variation of the price of another good. In modern 
notation:9
∂xi p, R
∂pj
= si, j p, R – x j p, R
∂xi p, R
∂R
 (1.1)
Slutsky ([1915] 1953, eq. 55) also derived the following symmetry 
“condition”: 
sij =
∂xj
∂pi
+ xi
∂xj
∂R =
∂xi
∂pj
+ xj
∂xi
∂R = sji
 (1.2)
Actually, sij is the “residual variability” of the j th good for a “compen-
sated variation” of the price pi (Slutsky [1915] 1953, 43), that is, for a 
variation of income that allows the consumer to buy exactly the same 
bundle as before.
Moreover, on the basis of the above results, Slutsky wonders about the 
empirical counterpart of the second derivatives of the utility function. 
He comes to a negative conclusion, which is of direct consequence for 
distinguishing between complementary and competitive goods. Indeed, 
Slutsky provides the first explicit challenge to the ALEP criterion.10 His 
conclusion is a final judgment: “This whole edifice falls if one remains 
loyal to the formal definition of utility, for it is impossible to deduce 
from the facts of behavior the character (that is, the sign) of the second 
derivative of utility” (54).11
As a brief summary of this sketchy early history of the concept of com-
plementarity, one can see that complementarity was the object of more 
or less parallel investigations on the part of Fisher, Pareto, Johnson, and 
Slutsky. All of them had the ALEP criterion in mind and tried either to 
trace its limits or to complete it with an analysis of indifference curves. 
Pareto is the one who shifted the conceptualization of complementarity 
Jean-Sébastien Lenfant / Complementarity and Demand Theory 55
 9. Where xi is the quantity demanded of commodity i, pj is the price of commodity j, and 
R is income, while si,j is the Slutsky substitution effect, representing the differential change in 
the consumption of i when the differential change of pj is compensated so that consumers can 
still just afford their original consumption bundles.
10. Of course, Pareto showed that the ALEP criterion is not self-sufficient to have clear-cut 
implications on demand behavior. For all that, he did not mean explicitly that the converse was 
true, that is, that demand behavior could not deliver some information about complementarity 
in the ALEP sense, at least on the basis of global information on prices and quantities bought.
11. For an appraisal of Slutsky’s interest in complementarity, see Lenfant 2003.
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by emphasizing the theory of choice, and Slutsky completed the move. 
Despite these differences, their reflections on complementarity share a 
common feature: the concept is regarded as a two-good relation. This is 
precisely this common horizon that would progressively collapse in the 
next twenty years. Also, it is remarkable that the complex relations between 
utility, demand, and preferences opened the door to many different lines 
of thought in developing the theory of demand and in connecting it with 
complementarity. As a result, in the 1920s and early 1930s, economists 
did not have a satisfactory definition of complementarity.
Taking Complementarity Seriously  
in the 1920s and Early 1930s
Under the influence of the early econometricians, the interest in comple-
mentarity was widespread among economists of the 1920s and 1930s, and 
the Hicks and Allen contributions (especially Hicks and Allen 1934) to the 
theory of value constituted the acme of the work on complementarity.
The great difference in the history of the ALEP definition that I have 
just recounted lies in the fact that the need for a new definition of com-
plementarity preceded the definition itself and that no definition seemed 
to apply naturally. From this moment on, something was on track for a 
complete reshaping of demand theory along the lines of Pareto and 
Fisher. One reason for this was the growing interest in the 1920s in the 
Lausanne school in England and the United States. In addition, Mar-
shallian ideas on supply, demand, and surplus were subjected to increas-
ing criticism as statistical economists and early econometricians played 
a growing role in the development of economics.12
The idea that competitive goods and complementary goods should be 
taken into account in the statistical analysis of demand was already at 
stake at the very beginning of the twentieth century. In 1907 Rudolfo 
Benini had expressed the demand for coffee in Italy as a function of the 
prices of coffee and sugar, using the method of multiple correlation. In the 
1920s, estimations of demand functions for agricultural products some-
times incorporated complementary and competitive goods. But it is remark-
able that complementarity was never a subject of serious speculation but 
only a way to implement new statistical tools. None of the main studies of 
demand reflect on the best way to integrate substitutes and complements 
56 History of Political Economy 38:5 (2006)
12. On this question, see Stigler 1954, Christ 1985, and Morgan 1990.
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or even address how to know if a good should be counted as a substitute 
or as a complement.13
Things would change radically in the years 1930–33. The recognition 
of a need for proper reflection on complementarity was progressively 
fostered by econometricians such as Mordecai Ezekiel, W. F. Ferger, and 
Elisabeth Waterman Gilboy, and by economists at the frontier between 
statistical analysis and pure economic theory, such as Marco Fanno and 
Paul N. Rosenstein-Rodan.14 They pointed out that (1) it was necessary 
to identify competitive and complementary goods and to neutralize their 
influences on the demand for a good if one aims at measuring elasticity 
of demand; and (2) the way to introduce related goods within the statisti-
cal studies on demand is not self-evident. Which related good should be 
retained in the estimation? What method should be privileged for this 
purpose? What would be the theory underlying the methods? Answering 
those questions soon appeared as a requisite for developing statistical 
studies of demand.
It is quite probable that the critical assessment of Henry Moore’s ris-
ing demand for pig iron in Economic Cycles ([1914] 1967) was a starting 
point for all this. Moore’s results were criticized not only for a kind of 
lack of rigor or patience with statistical methodology but also for his con-
ception of demand that was at odds with the Marshallian law of demand 
and uninterested in a fruitful cooperation between theoretical economics 
and statistical economics (Working 1927; Lehfeldt 1915). Thus R. A. 
Lehfeldt (1915, 410–11) pointed out that Moore had estimated something 
that was “much more nearly a supply curve.” Those critical assessments 
are known to be the point of departure of the identification problem in 
econometrics. But they also show that early statistical economists 
strongly disagreed on the role and the place of statistical economics and 
on the purpose of statistical demand studies. Was it to estimate some-
thing else than the Marshallian demand curve? Was it to pursue the 
never-ending goal of estimating it? Ferger (1932, 36) would sum up this 
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13. Even Schultz, who was to champion integrating choice analysis and statistical laws of 
demand, did not consider that complementary and competitive goods were instrumentally 
useful for computing statistical laws of demand. In The Statistical Laws of Demand and Sup-
ply, with Special Application to Sugar (1928b), he introduced the price of different goods 
together with a temporal variable and eventually eliminated those other goods from the 
regression, considering that the temporal variable should represent all the variations.
14. See also Ezekiel’s bibliography (1933, 172). The most important articles for the present 
story, leaving Schultz aside, are Fanno 1926, 1929, 1933; Ferger 1932; Gilboy 1930, 1932, 1934; 
Ezekiel 1927, 1933; Wright 1929, 1930; Lehfeldt 1914, 1915; and Rosenstein-Rodan 1933.
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“great disagreement regarding the concepts involved” in statistical 
demand curves. He notes that “in none of the methods thus far consid-
ered has the fundamental condition of the classical definition of static 
demand curves been realized—that all other things remain unchanged” 
(59; emphasis in original). In the same vein, in 1933, Ezekiel could still 
regret that “in spite of the general recognition of the importance of com-
peting products, no one appears as yet to have attempted to formulate 
clearly the exact way in which they enter into the demand situation, or to 
determine on a logical basis which is the best way to bring them into the 
statistical investigation” (173).
In the first issue of Econometrica, Fanno underlined the technical dif-
ficulties raised by the study of the influence of a good’s price on the 
demand for another good. To study the relationships between prices and 
quantities of substitutes requires accounting “for the simultaneous varia-
tions of the prices of all the goods within the group” (Fanno 1933, 165). 
Thus it is necessary to integrate interdependence in the statistical regres-
sions and also to know how to select those related goods that are sup-
posed to enter into the regression. Practically, the econometrician has to 
restrain the number of goods related by “direct economic relationships” 
(162). Ezekiel echoes Fanno’s recommendations by comparing two mod-
els of interrelated demand. In the first model, p1 is explained by x1 and 
x2, whereas in the second model p1 is explained by x1 and p2 (and sym-
metrically for p2):
{p1 = h1 x1, x2p2 = h2 x1, x2  (1.3a)
{p1 = H1 x1, p2p2 = H2 x2, p1  (1.3b)
Ezekiel mixed theoretical and statistical arguments in favor of the first 
model and against the second. The choice of one model over the other may 
first depend on a hypothesis about the reactivity of one market. In this 
case, the second model may be favored. But the second model is flawed 
by its circularity, the price of each good being explained partly by itself 
(Ezekiel 1933, 178).
Thus, at the beginning of the thirties, the early econometrists of demand 
(especially in agricultural economics) show an urgent interest for a theory 
of related demand, but the theoretical and statistical methods for it are still 
in the wings or, at best, too controversial. Around 1933, the time was ripe 
58 History of Political Economy 38:5 (2006)
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for a fruitful dialogue between the pure theory of choice and the statistical 
analysis of demand in order to provide a useful definition of complemen-
tarity and substitution. Any theory that may help communicate the impact 
of the price of a good on the demand for another would be welcome for 
estimating statistical demand curves. Henry Schultz would be the one to 
develop this connection. What remains to be understood is to what extent 
those early econometrists thought it useful to support their analyses with 
the Paretian theory of choice as it existed at the time.
From Moore to Schultz
The relationship between statistical economics and pure economics and 
how it evolved is best perceptible through the writings of Henry Moore 
and Henry Schultz on demand studies.15 There we can find the justifica-
tion for developing statistical economics on the basis of pure mathemat-
ical economics. Among the American economists, Moore and Schultz 
shared a good knowledge of Léon Walras and Pareto, and the former 
were convinced that general equilibrium was the only solid basis for 
doing economics.16 But to Moore, it deserved to be completed and criti-
cized for its static nature. Already in Economic Cycles and later in Fore-
casting the Yield and the Price of Cotton ([1917] 1967), Moore would 
clarify the way statistical economics should account for interdependencies 
between markets.
To put it briefly, Moore’s aim in Economic Cycles is to establish a 
chain of causality between “the law of the cycles of rainfall” and “the 
law of the cycles of the crops,” on the one side, and “the law of Eco-
nomic Cycles,” on the other ([1914] 1967, 135). The statistical relation 
between the demand for agricultural products and the price of agricul-
tural products is presented as a propagation mechanism for cycles, and 
Moore devotes chapter 4 to the analysis of demand.17 Moore’s economics 
relies on supposedly natural laws whose perception is made difficult 
because of endless cycles and changes. Further, those natural laws are in 
essence dynamic and need technical abilities to be discovered. The 
dynamic law of demand, in Moore’s mind, must take into account both 
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15. In 1916 Schultz began to study under Moore at Columbia. After the war, he was at the 
LSE, studying under Arthur L. Bowley and Karl Pearson. He came back to Columbia for his 
PhD in 1925 (Mirowski 1990, 605).
16. See Moore 1929; Schultz 1927, 1928a.
17. On Moore and demand, more generally, see Wulwick 1995.
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the interdependencies of demands (and markets) and the unavoidable 
temporal character of all laws in economics. Instead of “an idol of the 
static state,” Moore wishes to obtain statistical equations by “attacking 
directly the problem in its full concreteness,” “other things changing 
according to their natural order,” thus providing the “Statistical Comple-
ment to Deductive Economics” (64, 66, 67).
Although Moore attached great importance to Pareto’s and Walras’s 
expositions of the economic system, he did not praise them for the utility 
foundations of it and, more generally, for the static representation of the 
equilibrium based on a mechanical metaphor. For this reason, he wanted 
to go beyond putative explanations of economic phenomena through a 
theory of utility and a mechanical representation of it (Moore [1914] 
1967, 85). In return, he maintained the principle of interdependence of 
markets. As a result, substitutability, once disentangled from any a priori 
and rationalist foundation, is seen as a main cause of endless theoretical 
difficulties that would be overcome only through the search for dynami-
cal laws of demand:
In treatises on pure economics, particularly in those in which mathe-
matical analysis is employed, the masters of the a priori method [i.e., 
mathematical economists using general equilibrium] point out what 
they regard as the extreme difficulty of the actual problem of the rela-
tion of price to quantity of commodity—a difficulty growing out of the 
interrelation of the many factors in the problem. . . . The degree in which 
hay, oats, and potatoes are substituted for corn is dependent not only 
upon the price of corn but also on their own several prices, and these 
latter prices are, in turn, dependent upon the supply and price of corn! 
This statement of the problem, complex as it appears, is unduly sim-
plified; and it is presented not in order to ridicule the work of the mas-
ters who have elaborated the method of stating the problem in the form 
of simultaneous equations, but to show how hopelessly remote from 
reality is the very best theoretical treatment of the problem of the rela-
tion of price to the quantity of commodity, and to suggest, from the 
results of the preceding pages of this chapter, how imaginary, theoreti-
cal difficulties are dispelled by solving real problems. (82)
Moore’s theoretical and technical apparatus is thus presented as a solu-
tion to endless theoretical disputes in pure economics. All the complex 
relationships that are never tested become of secondary order or even null 
and void once we calculate a simpler relation on the whole economic cycle. 
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Calculating the elasticity of demand for a representative good over a suf-
ficiently long period and using the method of multiple correlation gives 
“an extremely accurate formula summarizing the relation between varia-
tions in price and variations in the amount of the commodity that is 
demanded” (70).18
It is commonly accepted that Moore had no great influence on other 
econometricians except for Schultz. But it is also known that Schultz 
was not a faithful follower of Moore.19 The fascinating point is that 
Schultz tended to extirpate demand analysis from Moore’s general proj-
ect and methodology and to interpret it as an independent given that may 
still be improved; all subsequent works by Schultz on demand can be 
interpreted as implementing this program. On this occasion, Schultz 
gave central importance to utility theory for the statistical analysis of 
demand. The structural properties of demand are not yet to be sought in 
natural laws of cycles; they are anchored in utility theory. Little by little, 
Schultz abandoned references to a sui generis dynamic law of demand 
and constructed this law on the basis of a statistical static law of demand 
whose shifts from time to time would provide a dynamic law. Thus 
Schultz’s (1928b, 23) criticism of the “neoclassical” theory of demand 
against the theory of the “mathematical school” was concentrated more on 
the impossibility of a ceteris paribus framework. By referring here and 
there to utility theory and to the influence of substitution on demand 
curves, Schultz (1931a) shows that integrating utility theory and statistical 
analysis of interdependencies is a possible direction of research at the 
beginning of the thirties, one he would always privilege against the use 
of budget data (Schultz 1933). Of the economists who may have inspired 
Schultz on the subject, Fanno seems to have been the most important.20 
Among the first to suggest a possible path between choice theory and 
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18. A general presentation of the status of demand analysis within Moore’s overall eco-
nomic project is beyond the scope of this article. Moore would come back regularly in his 
other writings on the subject, with less optimism and less radically maybe, but still with great 
fidelity to his first ideas. Notably, he always considered multiple correlation as the best way to 
integrate a good number of related goods in the statistical laws of demand and in elasticity 
calculations (Moore 1917, 147–51). His approach is always the same and shows a good knowl-
edge of Pareto and Walras and a constant search for improving techniques for measuring 
elasticity (Moore 1926; 1929, chap. 3).
19. It is mainly through the eyes of Schultz that I have been led to comment on Moore’s 
work. Quite different assessments of Moore’s work can be found in Stigler 1954, Christ 1985, 
and Mirowski 1990.
20. On the importance of related demands for statistical demand curves, Schultz (1938, 
581) recognized Fanno’s 1926 memoir as his main source of inspiration.
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statistical studies, Fanno (1933, 164) developed a correspondence between 
substitutability as it is represented with indifference curves and substitut-
ability as it can be measured through the proportional variation of prices 
following any external shock on the demand for a good. He had already 
introduced this idea in his memoir (Fanno 1926) and again in 1929. Around 
1930, Schultz (1931b, 83) was clearly looking in that direction, echoing 
Pareto’s earlier statement:
The properties of the utility functions and indifference curves are 
very intimately related to certain characteristics of the laws of demand 
and supply. As an example, let us consider the demand and supply of 
an individual who has two or more commodities at his disposal. . . . 
When the consumptions of these commodities are not independent of 
one another, the quantity demanded may at first increase and then 
decrease with an increase in price, i.e., the demand curve may be pos-
itively inclined for part of its extent. . . . In [my] opinion, a study of 
these theoretical relationships will throw a flood of light on the prob-
lems connected with the derivation of demand curves from statistics.
Schultz developed this program in two steps between 1932 and 1935. 
However, complementarity was still to be defined within the framework 
of choice, and for that the main contribution came from Hicks and 
Allen.
2. The Hicks-Allen Article
The Hicks and Allen joint product—“A Reconsideration of the Theory 
of Value”—was published in 1934, in the February and May issues of 
Economica. It is of great importance to the extent that it opens up a new 
conception of the relationships between choice and the psychological 
foundations of choice. This is considered as true today as it was in 1934, 
and the Hicks-Allen article was immediately widely adopted—if not 
unanimously—as a solid foundation for demand theory.21
Among the subjects connected to choice and demand, the definition 
of complementarity is given much attention in the article. Hicks and 
Allen saw that all this was an inevitable necessity of the development of 
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21. In other respects, the Hicks and Allen article is outdated, especially for the debate on 
integrability and the role of the decreasing marginal rate of substitution for negative semi-
definiteness of the Slutsky matrix (cf. Samuelson 1938a, 1938b, 1950).
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choice theory.22 The most significant transformation of the concept, and 
certainly what allows speaking of a revolution, is that complementarity 
and competitiveness will no longer appear as a relation between two 
goods dealt with apart from all other goods in the set of choice. From 
now on, economists will have to deal with two concepts, according to 
the kind of modeling they use. The first is “substitutability,” represented 
by the coefficient of elasticity of substitution within the two-good case. 
The second is “complementarity and competitiveness” between goods, 
represented by the coefficient of “elasticity of complementarity” within 
the general case. This is certainly the most important achievement 
together with the now-familiar Hicksian distinction between a price 
effect and an income effect. In this article, Hicks and Allen provided a 
new definition of complements and substitutes that was fully articulated 
with the theory of demand. To that extent, it is legitimate to take this 
article as a watershed in the history of complementarity and of demand.
Below I present the Hicks and Allen article in three steps. First, I 
focus on elasticity of substitution. Second, I concentrate on the new def-
initions of substitutes and complementary goods. Third, I reflect on their 
enterprise from a methodological point of view. 
Demand Theory and the Elasticity of Substitution
The whole analysis of choice and demand is based on the hypothesis of 
a decreasing marginal rate of substitution, which is presented as replac-
ing the old hypothesis of decreasing marginal utility. Consider Ryx (x, y) the 
marginal rate of substitution of x to y, that is, the quantity of x that would 
exactly compensate the individual for the loss of one unit of y (Hicks and 
Allen 1934, 55, 198). This marginal rate is given by the differential equa-
tion dx + Ryx dy = 0.
In the two-good case, the preferences of the individual can be entirely 
expressed (independently of market conditions) through three indexes of 
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22. Allen (1934c, 110) expressed what was at stake at the surface of things, that is, in the 
development of choice theory as a prerequisite for demand theory: “It is the existence of 
mutual relationships between goods, finding expression in the various forms assumed by 
indifference curves, that distinguishes the general theory of choice from the simpler and more 
artificial theory which serves in the case of one consumers’ [sic] good only” (see also Allen 
1934b, 486). Later in Value and Capital, Hicks was able to put things in a wider perspective: 
the Paretian theory of choice based on the analysis of complementary and competitive goods, 
he says, “started as an extension but ended as a revolution” ([1939] 1946, 13).
HOPE385-04lenfant.indd   63 7/6/06   6:47:23 PM
elasticity: the elasticity of substitution s and two coefficients of income 
variation rx and ry.23 The measurement of substitutability is thus given 
by the elasticity of substitution between X and Y on a point (Hicks and 
Allen 1934, 59).24 (I follow the practice of Hicks and Allen in distin-
guishing between goods X and Y and the quantity consumed or chosen 
of those goods, x and y.) The coefficients rx and ry express the relation-
ships between two adjacent indifference curves along the x-axis and the 
y-axis, respectively, and are called (rather misleadingly) the “coefficients 
of income variation.” Those three coefficients are independent of any 
price or market data. From the hypothesis of a decreasing marginal rate 
of substitution, rx and ry cannot be negative simultaneously.25
Given prices px and py and a fixed income m, Hicks and Allen derive 
the decomposition of the effect of a price change of px on the demands 
for x and y. Having defined the budget coefficient kx = xpx/m and the 
income-elasticity of demand for x, em,x = (m/x)(∂x/∂m), and having shown 
that em,x = srx, the price-elasticities of demand epx,x and epx,x are decom-
posed into a sum of two effects, one involving em,x (the income effect) 
and one involving s (the substitution effect).
{epx,x = κ x eÇ, x + 1 – κx σepx,y = κ x eÇ, x + κxσ  (2.1)
In this two-good case, the substitution effect provides an index of sub-
stitutability. Hicks and Allen note that the substitution term in epx,y “is 
always negative” (i.e., the compensated fall in the price of one good 
causes a substitution of this good for the other) and symmetrical in x and 
y, thus being “a general measure of substitutability.”26 Hence, as Allen 
underlined it,27 “Two goods must always be regarded as substitutes, or as 
‘competitive,’ when they stand by themselves; complementarity is a char-
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23. s = (d( x—y)/(x/y))/(dRyx /Ryx); rx = (∂Ryx /∂y)/(Ryx /y) and ry = –(∂Ryx /∂x)/(Ryx /x). s takes all values 
between 0 and ∞.
24. In this article, it will be useful to disentangle the 1934 Hicks-Allen joint product. I               
refer to Allen’s part as “Hicks and Allen” and to Hicks’s part as “Hicks and Allen.”
25. In the “normal” case, both coefficients are positive; in the “exceptional” case, one of 
them is negative.
26. Of course, the variation of demand relative to the price change of the other good can 
be either positive or negative, but it does not indicate complementarity or competitiveness.
27. Allen does not stand firmly on his terminology, for he refers to competitiveness either 
as a generic word in the two-good case or as a specific word (opposed to complementarity) in 
the general case.
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acteristic which does not appear until at least three goods are considered” 
(Hicks and Allen 1934, 202).
The Concept of Complementarity
Complementarity and competitiveness appear only in the general case, 
and it is thus possible to “look for observable evidence of the ‘competi-
tive’ or ‘complementary’ nature of the relations between the three goods” 
(Hicks and Allen 1934, 210). The change in the demand for Y when the 
price of X falls ∂y(m, px, py, pz)/∂px splits into an income effect and a sub-
stitution effect (i.e., a substitution in favor of X). This substitution may 
take place at the expense of both Y and Z (as in the two-good case), and 
in this case X and Y are declared competitive (against Z), and X and Z 
are declared competitive (against Y). But substitution may also take 
place, differently, at the expense of Z only while the quantity of Y rises. 
In that case, Y is complementary with X against Z.
As noted by Hicks, this definition is not altogether free of market data 
and thus not a pure property of preferences, for it supposes implicitly 
that the reshuffling between Y and Z following the change in the price px 
takes place without any change in the relative price py /pz: “Since there is 
implicit in our definition this assumption about price ratios, we have not 
succeeded in defining complementarity (as we ought to do) purely in 
terms of the individual’s preference-scale; we are making a reference to 
the market which is better avoided” (Hicks and Allen 1934, 70).
Analytically, the differential equation of the indifference surface is dx + 
Ryx(x, y, z)dy + R
z
x(x, y, z)dz = 0. The preference complex is now represented 
by nine indexes (in the integrable case). There are six distinct coefficients 
of the elasticity of substitution and one general coefficient s measuring 
mutual substitutability between goods. Three of the distinct coefficients 
represent the “ordinary” measure of elasticity of substitution (the elasticity 
of substitution between i and j being measured along the ij plan, k being 
fixed, ijsij); the three others, “nonstandard” coefficients, measure the elas-
ticity of substitution between i and j along another plan (ik or jk) (e.g., iksjk 
is the elasticity of substitution between j and k measured along the indif-
ference direction [ik], j being fixed).28 From those six coefficients and the 
general coefficient s, Hicks and Allen have six new measures of elastici-
ties of substitution and complementarity in the three-good case:
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28. Under the integrability assumption privileged here, iksjk = jksik.
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1.  s /yzsyz, s /xzsxz, s /xzsxz, being the three elasticities of substitution 
between one good and the pair of the two other goods (e.g., the 
first one is the elasticity of substitution between X and the pair YZ). 
They are always positive, as in the two-good case. 
2.  sxy = s /xzsyz, sxz = s /xyszy, syz = s /yxszx being the three elasticities 
of complementarity of a pair of goods against the third one (e.g., 
sxy is the elasticity of complementarity of the pair XY against Z). If 
the elasticity of complementarity is positive, it denotes a comple-
mentary relation between two goods relative to the third one.
To those six coefficients, one must add
3.  The three coefficients of “income-variation” rx, ry, rz.
From this complete set of tools describing preferences in the three-
good case, Hicks and Allen obtain the general expression of the effect of 
the variation of price on demand (Hicks and Allen 1934, 209) with still 
an income term (function of the income-variation coefficient) and a sub-
stitution term (a function of the elasticities of substitution and comple-
mentarity):
{epx, x = κ x eÇ, x + 1 – κ x σσyzyzepx, x = κ x eÇ, y + κ xσxyepx, z = κ x eÇ, z + κ xσxz  (2.2)
The second term in each equation of (2.2) indicates the substitution 
effect. Complementarity must be read on the second and third equations:
The effect of substitution following a fall in the price of X is to increase 
or decrease the demand for Y according as the elasticity of comple-
mentarity of Y with X against Z is positive or negative. A negative 
elasticity of complementarity implies that Y competes with X against 
Z and a positive elasticity that Y complements X against Z. The signs 
of the elasticities of complementarity determine the competitive and 
complementary nature of the relations between the three goods and 
their magnitudes indicate the extent of the relations. (211)
From those new definitions of complementarity and substitution in 
the general case, a few methodological and analytic remarks are in order. 
To implement a new definition is not without unexpected consequences, 
and it is important to catch all these consequences.
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Some Analytic and Methodological  
Comments on Complementarity and  
Substitutability in Hicks and Allen 1934
Hicks and Allen 1934 is filled with references to the methodological and 
analytic consequences of the new definitions of complementarity. While 
the authors insist that the new tools are quantitative ones, they also insist 
on unintended properties of the new definitions that may appear as more 
or less awkward. Hicks and Allen aim at breaking with the traditional 
theory of utility, hence the quantitative spirit that permeates the article. 
The consequences of the new theory of utility have to be worked out com-
pletely, they say, and new concepts must be developed: “It is hoped in this 
way to assist in the construction of a theory of value in which all concepts 
that pretend to quantitative exactitude, can be rigidly and exactly defined” 
(Hicks and Allen 1934, 55; emphasis added).29
Analytically, one can make some remarks about the new definitions. 
First, some traditional representations are dispelled. For instance, Hicks 
and Allen note that the cross-price effects on demand ∂x(m, px, py, pz)/∂py 
and ∂y(m, px, py, pz)/∂px are not symmetrical except when the income terms 
are of the same magnitude. Moreover, if income-effects terms are of oppo-
site sign and relatively large compared with the elasticity of complementa-
rity, then ∂x/∂py and ∂y/∂px will differ “not only in magnitude, but also in 
sign” (Hicks and Allen 1934, 214). The second remark deals with the num-
ber of complementary relationships within the economy. Hicks and Allen 
show that the three elasticities of substitution and complementarity 
between any two goods are linked by the following constraint:
 (1 – kx)s /yzsyz + k ysxy + kzsxz = 0  
(and two other similar constraints relative to xy and xz). (2.3)
Consequently, s /yzsyz being necessarily positive, elasticities of comple-
mentarity sxy and sxz cannot be simultaneously positive, and hence “it is not 
possible for more than one pair of the three goods to be complementary” 
(213).30 Thus the new concept of complementarity, as it appears in a choice 
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29. For instance, the authors seem to insist on the fact that the principal advantage of the 
decreasing marginal rate of substitution over the decreasing marginal utility is that “it 
becomes significant and useful to ask: ‘increasing how rapidly?’” (Hicks and Allen 1934, 58). 
This is precisely what the marginal elasticity of substitution is supposed to give: a measure of 
the curvature of the indifference loci.
30. See also Hicks and Allen 1934, 70; Hicks and  Allen 1934, 211.
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framework, implies some kind of asymmetry between complementarity 
and competitiveness from the outset.
The third remark deals with the generalization of the analysis to an 
n-good case. Nothing is said about the best way to account for comple-
mentarity and competitiveness in this general case (n > 3). As regards 
this, Hicks and Allen remain evasive as to what kind of generalization 
would be a good measure of complementarity and competitiveness.31
The fourth remark is about independence. There remains to be known 
what status will be given to independent goods (once the ALEP criterion 
is rejected for not being independent of monotone transformations of the 
utility function). Hicks and Allen reject the most immediate definition of 
independence as an intermediate situation between complementarity and 
competitiveness. Curiously, they appeal to a purely introspective idea of 
what independence should consist of: “For, if, as would happen at our 
watershed, the marginal rate of substitution between Y and Z is unaffected 
by compensating changes of X and Z, this does not mean that the goods 
are in any useful sense ‘independent’—there subsists a very complex rela-
tion between them” (Hicks and Allen 1934, 74).Hicks and Allen’s develop-
ment on independence is not very well articulated indeed. Hicks (Hicks 
and Allen 1934, 74–76) expands mainly on the idea that X is independent 
of the pair YZ if the marginal rate of substitution between Y and Z is inde-
pendent of the quantity of X. This definition does not prevent per se any 
type of relation between X and Y against Z (either complementarity or 
competitiveness). Nevertheless, X and Y can be complementary only if Y is 
an inferior good. Allen’s mathematical treatment is centered on the 
hypothesis of mutual independence between X, Y, and Z (Hicks and Allen 
1934, 214–18). As shown from all those analytic remarks on complemen-
tarity, we can draw a first conclusion. The first effect of this reconstruction 
of demand theory is that the whole conception of complementarity is 
metamorphosed. Complementarity and substitutability appear now as 
derivative concepts and necessarily lose the autonomy characteristic of 
the ALEP definition. At the same time, complementarity and competitive-
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31. Hicks will tackle this question in Value and Capital through the use of a “composite 
commodity” (see the following section). It is nevertheless interesting to wonder about the 
minimum number of competitiveness relations in an n-good case. In this case, there are n 
constraints similar to (2.3) and thus at least n pairs of competitive goods in the whole sys-
tem. Compared with the total number of complementarity or competitiveness relations 
n(n – 1)(n – 2)/2, the minimum number of competitiveness relations is shrinking as the number 
of goods is increased.
HOPE385-04lenfant.indd   68 7/6/06   6:47:30 PM
ness are at least given a theoretical content within the theory of choice and 
demand.32 Consequently, competitiveness and complementarity are now 
coextensive with the new theory of demand,33 and the metamorphosis of 
the concept would not be challenged for long.34
Another question is to know how Hicks and Allen were led to this 
reconstruction of demand theory. It is beyond the scope of this article to 
enter precisely into a genetic history of the Hicks-Allen article. It is nev-
ertheless remarkable that, according to Allen (1935, 158), the main inter-
est of the new definition is that it “applies at once in the explanation of 
the inter-relations of individual demands under market conditions,” a 
subject of interest for econometricians, as we have seen. To put it in a 
few words, Hicks and Allen 1934 is the product of two converging top-
ics. First, there is Hicks’s decomposition between income and price effects 
linking elasticity of substitution and elasticity of demand.35 Second, there 
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32. For all that, the new definitions are not completely deprived of introspective qualities—
that complementarity between two goods depends on which third good is associated to the 
choice and, more generally, on the context of choice.
33. Hicks and Allen are quite explicit about that when they deal with the two-good case: 
“It is perfectly consistent with the theory we have so far elaborated, to suppose that all goods 
are more or less related in consumption; yet we have made no use of the conception of com-
plementarity and competitive goods. We have not used it, because we had no need to use it; 
we had not yet come to the problem where it is relevant” (Hicks and Allen 1934, 69).
34. Later, as he would comment on the Hicks-Allen definition, Allen insisted on the fact 
that the new definition was radically different from the ALEP definition, that it was some-
thing else and that economists were progressively discovering how different it was: “It is 
becoming increasingly evident, as its implications are worked out and its range extended, that 
this [Hicks-Allen] definition of complementarity provides a more constructive tool than the 
notoriously barren one based on the sign of the cross second-order derivative of the utility 
function. It must not be supposed, further, that the new definition and the old coincide when 
utility is taken as measurable—the new definition is not only wider but radically different 
from the old. Even when the utility function is determinate, the sign of the cross derivative 
cannot be expected to give results in this field of complementarity. Surely we have here some-
thing more than an ‘axiomatic experiment’” (Allen 1935, 158 n). For all that, one must keep 
in mind that (1) some authors have challenged the new definition on the occasion of a debate 
on “intrinsic complementarity” inaugurated by Oskar Lange (1940); and (2) Allen’s statement 
does not preclude searching for empirical implications of ALEP complementarity (Chipman 
1977, Weber 2000).
35. The Hicksian decomposition is heuristically different from Slutsky’s “residual varia-
tions,” and it cannot be justified on empiricist grounds. It is rather a purely instrumental 
device based on the unobservable concept of indifference curves and hence possessing other 
heuristic advantages (Chipman and Lenfant 2002). The textual evidence in Hicks and Allen 
1934 leads the reader back to a debate following Hicks’s Theory of Wages ([1932] 1957) and 
Robinson’s The Theory of Imperfect Competition (1933) and their independent introduction 
of the concept of elasticity of substitution. The debate took place mainly in the Review of 
Economic Studies and is referred to incidentally in Hicks and Allen 1934, 59 n. Hicks would 
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is a desire to expand demand analysis to interrelations of demand in a 
general framework (n ≥ 3) and thus to provide a new definition of com-
plementarity, as Allen had been convinced of through his earlier arti-
cles.36 Behind this was also a growing interest for econometrics and for 
the questions raised by econometrists. As Hicks (1981, 3) recounted 
later, the 1934 article “also reckoned, quite explicitly, among the things 
that gave rise to it, Joan Robinson’s definition of elasticity of substitution 
(e.s.) and a question about complementary goods that had been raised by 
Henry Schultz (of Chicago). It is thus not surprising that it made a noise 
in the world of economists.”37 So we are led back to Schultz and to the 
econometrics of complementarity.
3. Constructing the Hicks-Slutsky  
Theory of Demand
As was shown in section 1, around 1930, Schultz wished to tie the econo-
metrics of demand with the theory of demand based on rational choice. 
Soon after, he implemented the Hicks-Allen theory of value into the 
econometrics of demand. There are two stages to this story. To begin with, 
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always insist on the influence of Robbins’s seminar on the 1934 article: it was also “the prod-
uct of discussions, in which several others took part, in the Robbins seminar at LES” (Hicks 
1981, 3). Also, Hicks would give some insights of his own evolution during those years on 
many occasions. Hicks (1973, 3 n) sketched his own way from Theory of Wages to Hicks and 
Allen 1934 very succinctly: “Theory of Wages elasticity of substitution; Joan Robinson’s elas-
ticity of substitution (Imperfect Competition) 1933; proof of equivalence in two-factor case; 
Lerner’s proof that the Robinson elasticity is a property of an isoquante; my own realization 
that the same geometrical property would hold for an indifference curve. Those are the steps 
that led to the Hicks-Allen article.” See also Hicks 1981, 3–5.
36. Allen was trained as a statistician at the LSE, and he maintained an interest in choice 
and utility theory throughout his career, from the time of his first published article, “The 
Foundations of a Mathematical Theory of Exchange” (1932). He then wrote some other arti-
cles on complementarity before cooperating with Hicks (Allen 1934a, 1934b, 1934c). Taken 
together, these articles provide a thorough study of ALEP complementarity in relation to 
indifference curves and utility functions. Allen was certainly the first economist to grasp the 
central importance of complementarity as a consequence of Paretian choice theory: “It is the 
existence of mutual relationships between goods, finding expression in the various forms 
assumed by indifference curves, that distinguishes the general theory of choice from the 
simpler and more artificial theory which serves in the case of one consumers’ good only” (1934c, 
110). Hicks had been acquainted with the subject of complementarity and choice theory by 
reading Allen’s articles on the subject. Hicks presented the final product by saying that “the 
present paper is the result, first, of my own reflections about Mr. Allen’s work, and secondly, 
of our collaboration in working out the details of a theory which shall be free of the inconsisten-
cies detected in Pareto” (Hicks and Allen 1934, 55). Thus it is clear that Allen’s articles had 
circulated among economists at the LSE.
37. Allen (1934b) also mentioned Schultz 1933.
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in 1933 Schultz “tests” symmetry conditions on demand systems obtained 
by Hotelling (1932). Subsequently, facing bad statistical results, Schultz 
hints at the Hicks and Allen article and at the Slutsky article to test new 
kinds of theoretical relations: the Slutsky symmetry conditions. Between 
1933 and 1938 Schultz develops a sophisticated analysis of complemen-
tarity and a justification for the simpler cross-price effect definition based 
on Hotelling’s previous analysis. This led to Hicks’s reformulating the 
theory of demand in Value and Capital, which resulted eventually in the 
classical theory of the consumer.
The Schultz-Hotelling Tests on Demand Functions
In 1932 Hotelling and Schultz were searching for structural relations 
between demand functions, and they found similar theoretical constraints 
that Schultz and his team at Chicago would endeavor to test. The Schultz-
Hotelling cooperation on demand theory dates back to Hotelling’s arti-
cle “Edgeworth’s Taxation Paradox and the Nature of Demand and Sup-
ply Functions.” In this 1932 article, Hotelling proposed two conditions 
under which an apparently counterintuitive relationship might appear. 
Edgeworth ([1897] 1925) had shown that the taxation of a monopolized 
product might imply a lowering of its price. Hotelling shows that this 
result is not conditioned by the market structure (it might take place also 
under free competition). Hotelling’s model led to symmetry conditions 
on cross-price elasticities of demand for two goods. His article is inter-
esting because it is based on the same observation as Schultz’s, that is, 
that demand studies are characterized by a gap between deductive state-
ments on demand and purely inductive statistical relations. Thus Edge-
worth’s paradox stimulated “a critical examination” of the idea that 
“demand functions for several commodities need satisfy no conditions 
except the decrease of demand for each commodity when its price 
increases” (Hotelling 1932, 582). To sum up, Hotelling’s main idea is 
that the study of a multigood system might produce additional struc-
ture on demand relationships and that most of the poorly motivated 
properties of demand in the economic literature are due precisely to 
the fact that “the correlation of demand for different commodities is 
neglected” (583).
Through a multigood analysis, Hotelling provides structural con-
straints—the famous “Hotelling’s integrability conditions”38—on demand 
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rejected by Allen and Samuelson (see Chipman and Lenfant 2002).
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systems that can be deduced from the maximizing behavior of economic 
agents.39
∂xi /∂pj = ∂xj /∂pi (3.1)
Thus the cross-partial derivatives of demand functions are equal.
What is of interest to us is that many related goods are considered at 
once and lead to structural relations on demand functions that can be 
tested statistically. As he later commented: “Theoretical conditions exist 
with which empirical results may be compared” (Hotelling 1933, 409).
Schultz’s (1933, 506) own model was presented soon after in “Inter-
relations of Demand,” following Hotelling’s idea that “economic theory 
lays down certain conditions which the demand functions for any two 
related goods must fulfill. These are the conditions of consistency (inte-
grability conditions).”40 The main result of Schultz’s article was that sta-
tistical tests led to the conclusion that the “integrability conditions” were 
not satisfied exactly.41 That is, the results were sufficiently bad to war-
rant searching for more general conditions.
Schultz’s consistency conditions were the same as Hotelling’s but were 
deduced from a Paretian model based on maximizing utility under fixed 
income and with the hypothesis of a constant marginal utility of money 
income (thus allowing symmetric income effects and the symmetry of 
cross-partials of demand functions) (478, equations 19 and 20). The econo-
metric system to be tested (supposing linear demand curves) is thus:
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39. In fact, Hotelling’s constraints derive from two different models. The first one is a non-
standard model with entrepreneurial demand functions; the second one is based on a fixed-
income hypothesis. The detail of mathematical notations is to be found in Hotelling 1935, 68. 
Hotelling’s model differs sensibly from the Paretian model to the extent that there is neither a 
fixed income nor an income determined by the price of the initial endowments and that the 
functions describe what is now called “entrepreneurial” demand functions. But the results are 
the same as under the hypothesis of fixed income and constant marginal utility of money. In 
Hotelling’s view (1932, 592), his model was depicting something more general than the Pare-
tian model of consumer behavior, and it is adapted to a great variety of consumption circum-
stances. Hotelling does not provide any justification for this. On this model and its interpreta-
tion, see Hands and Mirowski 1998 and Chipman and Lenfant 2002.
40. That Hotelling and Schultz made simultaneous discoveries is not surprising. Indeed, 
Schultz and Hotelling’s research went hand in hand for two years. We know from Hotelling 
1939, 100, that Schultz had been a referee for the first draft of the 1932 article and that Schultz 
had informed Hotelling that he had found similar conditions under the constant marginal util-
ity hypothesis (Hands and Mirowski 1998). In fact, Schultz’s (1933, 481 n. 16) findings were 
stimulated by his reading of Hotelling’s draft. This “collaboration” led to a sustained corre-
spondence between Hotelling and Schultz that has been commented on by Hands and 
Mirowski (1998).
41. In his 1932 article, Hotelling already mentioned (in the note on page 594) that Schultz 
and his staff had not found promising results.
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{ xi = h i + ri, i pi + ri, j pjxj = hj + rj, i pi + r j, j pj  (3.2)
In this model, ri, j and rj,i will be negative in the case of complemen-
tary goods and positive in the case of competing goods. That Schultz 
preferred his own formulation of the model is due mainly to its heuristic 
properties. Interestingly, what Schultz meant in this case was that his 
model and the symmetry properties could be easily related to intuitive 
properties of the ALEP definition of complementarity. Thus, in 1933, 
Schultz was still attached to an introspective conception of complemen-
tarity based on utility:
I prefer, however, to adopt as my point of departure the fundamental 
classical definitions of related and independent commodities in terms 
of the utility functions, for these functions seem to me to lead more 
directly to the characteristics of the related demand equations with 
which we shall be primarily concerned in this paper, and to have other 
heuristic properties as well. (481 n. 16)42
Schultz makes a statistical test of those consistency conditions for 
four agricultural products: barley, corn, hay, and oats, with the idea to 
determine which pairs are completing and which ones are competing. 
One pair of goods will show a significant contradictory result, and sym-
metry conditionsthus are not satisfied. Considering that the symmetry 
conditions should at least be approximately satisfied, the subsisting con-
tradiction is commented on as follows, using the ALEP heuristics: “It is 
as though the relation between the two commodities were such that the 
utility of hay to farmers increases as the quantity of oats is increased, 
while the utility of oats decreases as the quantity of hay is increased! But 
such an explanation cannot be entertained” (Schultz 1933, 501).43At this 
stage, one can conclude that the first encounter of the Paretian theory of 
demand and statistical studies of demand is met with mixed success. The 
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42. In the same article, Schultz (1933, 481) also vindicates not following Fanno’s heuris-
tics, because it does not lead to testable relations (see also Court 1941, 139). On the same 
footing, Hotelling (1935), coming back to the subject, does not adhere to Schultz’s procedure 
and heuristics and shows some reluctance to adopt the fixed-income hypothesis. This is due to 
an attachment both for the physical analogy he had developed earlier and for a general equi-
librium model without the hypothesis of the constant marginal utility of money (Hotelling 
1935, 74). He is also more generous with Schultz’s results (67 n). On the justification of the 
fixed-income hypothesis, see Schultz 1935, 436.
43. Among the main reasons that may explain those disappointing results are that some 
other related goods may have been forgotten (Schultz 1933, 480n1, 510).
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Hicks and Allen article, together with the rediscovery of the Slutsky arti-
cle, are coming at the right time. It is to be expected that they will also 
affect the methodological justification of the model and the interpretation 
of the results.
The Schultz-Slutsky Model
In 1934 Schultz benefited not only from Hicks and Allen’s article but also 
from the discovery of Slutsky’s article (Chipman and Lenfant 2002). Both 
contributions were received at the precise moment when Schultz was look-
ing for new theoretical relationships on demand systems that might be 
tested. In “Interrelations of Demand, Price, and Income” (1935)—and 
again in his 1938 treatise—Schultz would devote most of his energy to 
developing the theory of related goods and its applications on the basis of 
Slutsky-Hicks-Allen demand analysis. To that extent, Schultz shares with 
Hicks and Allen the paternity of a modern theory of complementarity.
Two aspects of Schultz’s work demand attention. First, he adapted 
Hicks and Allen’s work in order to make it operational for statistical 
computation, and in this respect he preferred Slutsky’s decomposition 
between price effects (“residual variability”) and income effects. Sec-
ond, Schultz abandoned the psychological introspective framework 
associated with the ALEP definition, adopting instead a new method-
ological credo for economics—the so-called operationalist methodology 
(after Bridgman 1927) to which he meant to associate the Hicks-Allen 
definition. To that extent, his interpretation of Pareto’s recommendations 
appears, at first sight, more radical than Slutsky’s and even Hicks and 
Allen’s. For all that, it does not imply that Schultz is abiding strictly by 
an operationalist methodology in his reasoning. Neither does it mean 
that the reference to an operational procedure is a self-fulfilling argu-
ment to build an econometric analysis of demand. Indeed, Schultz (1935, 
474–75 n. 47) eventually shows a preference for Hotelling’s symmetry 
conditions. Thus Schultz’s arguments and methodological references are 
worth discussing further.
It is beyond the scope of this article to appraise Schultz’s implementa-
tion of the operationalist methodology into economics.44 Nevertheless, 
Schultz’s reflection on demand theory and complementarity is best under-
74 History of Political Economy 38:5 (2006)
44. On operationalism in general and its application in economics, see Caldwell 1982,            
chaps. 2, 9; Chipman and Lenfant 2002; Mirowski 1998; Mongin 1988, 2000.
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stood if one makes clear how he articulated different levels of argumenta-
tion: first, the reference to operationalism and to “operational procedures” 
in economics, then the practical use of this operational procedure for 
selecting one definition of complementarity, and finally the effective choice 
of one model of demand. Let us take each of those levels one at a time.
Schultz’s references to operationalism are not mere references to the 
methodology of the natural sciences. Although Schultz is certainly search-
ing for scientific criteria that may put economics on the same footing with 
physics, his frequent references to Bridgman 1927 testify that he consid-
ered Bridgman’s recommendations seriously for economics. This does not 
mean that Schultz is a strict operationalist. In his comments on Bridgman, 
Schultz (1938, 11) stresses the fact that economics will gain in making “a 
distinction between concepts which are defined in terms of operations and 
those which are defined in terms of properties of things.” The focus on 
operational procedures is presented as the main criteria for selecting one 
concept of complementarity over another. In Schultz’s own words: “The 
restatement and extension of the earliest concept of demand into forms 
which have meaning in terms of operations, which has been attempted in 
the foregoing pages, is the first step in the direction of the derivation of 
concrete statistical laws of demand” (12).
As an illustration of this method, Schultz’s comments on the Hicks-
Slutsky definition make it explicit that according to him, operational con-
cepts in economics should be based above all on market data rather than 
on experimental data. In this respect, the ALEP definition cannot be rec-
ommended because it is not reducible to the observation of market data:
According to [the ALEP definition], if we wish to know whether two 
commodities are completing, independent, or competing to an indi-
vidual, we must ask him (and he must be able to tell us) whether, as 
we increase the quantity of one of the goods, the final utility of the 
other increases, remains constant, or decreases. The operation calls 
for an introspective comparison of final degrees of utility, on his part. 
The size of his income and the number of commodities in the econ-
omy do not affect his ability to make the comparison in question. 
According to [the SHAS definition], if we wish to know whether the 
individual considers two commodities as completing, independent, or 
competing, we must note his income, and observe whether a fall in 
the price of one of the goods, accompanied by a compensating varia-
tion in his income, will cause him to increase, maintain constant, or 
decrease his purchase of the other. . . . The point is . . . that the answers 
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called for by [the SHAS definition] do not require a comparison of final 
utilities and may be obtained by observing the individual’s market 
behavior; whereas the answers called for by [the ALEP definition] can-
not be so obtained.” (Schultz 1935, 462–63) 
As a third step in this analysis of Schultz’s methodology for statistical 
demand studies, the selection of a statistical model of demand is based 
on instrumental considerations. In this respect, Schultz was led to prefer a 
model leading to the Hotelling symmetry conditions rather than the more 
general one based on Slutsky symmetry conditions. First, Schultz (1935, 
457) noted that Hotelling’s symmetry conditions are true only under spe-
cial circumstances, and that “although [they] . . . are approximately sat-
isfied by several concrete, statistical demand analyses, they rest on weak 
foundations.” In contrast, the more general Slutsky symmetry conditions 
lead to a new definition of complementarity. Two goods x and y are com-
plementary (or completing) if (458)
∂x
∂py
+ y ∂x
∂R =
∂y
∂px
+ y ∂y
∂R < 0. (3.3)
The system of linear demand functions to be tested is
{ x = c1 + c1,1 px + c1 , 2 py + c1, R Ry = c2 + c2,1 px + c2 , 2 py + c2, R R (3.4)
Then, x and y are complementary whenever (460)
c1, 2 + yc1, R = c2,1 + xc2, R < 0. (3.5)
Schultz provides statistical tests on those relationships for beef, pork, 
and mutton, using multiple regression. The quantity of each good is 
expressed as a function of the price of the three goods and of income. 
Schultz also tests pairs of goods (beef-pork, beef-mutton, pork-mutton). 
Results appear to be even worse than in the 1933 article. The only conclu-
sion drawn from those tests is that the price of each good is the most influ-
ential variable on its demand and that it is an obstacle to a careful analysis 
of complementarity (Schultz 1935, 472). Drawing the lessons from those 
articles, Schultz seemingly came to see that many difficulties were obvi-
ating the test of symmetry conditions. Actually, Schultz’s argument in 
favor of the Hotelling symmetry conditions over the Slutsky conditions is 
based on acknowledging the failure of the Slutsky symmetry conditions to 
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improve the quality of statistical estimations. Considering that nothing 
had been gained by using Slutsky symmetry conditions, and that “Hotell-
ing conditions and the corresponding Slutsky conditions are of approxi-
mately the same order of magnitude” (479) because of the smallness of 
aggregate income effects,45 Schultz eventually advocated that the use of 
Hotelling’s conditions might be enough to indicate “the type of relation 
existing between the two commodities” (479n51). So Schultz tended to 
regard income effects as relatively marginal compared with direct price 
effects, so that Hotelling’s conditions might be verified as well as Slutsky’s 
conditions at the market level without being open to any objection regard-
ing the aggregation procedure (475). At this last stage in the construction 
of a statistical model of demand, the reference to an operational procedure 
is of no use, and Schultz is just selecting the best model.
In a few words, one must distinguish between two types of arguments 
in Schultz’s work on complementarity. On the one hand, the so-called 
operationalist methodology is referred to as a justification for abandon-
ing the ALEP definition, whereas, on the other, the final choice between 
different statistical models is justified on more instrumental grounds.46 
In the final analysis, Schultz’s attitude toward disappointing results on 
the tests of symmetry conditions is oscillating between either the need to 
improve on statistical techniques or a disenchanted benign-neglect in 
favor of a simpler model of related demands.
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45. The conclusions are the same whatever the functional representation chosen (Schultz 
1935, fig. 5, 478). 
46. Friedman (1934), as one of Schultz’s assistants at Chicago, provided a new definition of 
complementarity that enlarged the Johnson and Allen definitions. It was inserted partly into 
Schultz 1938. Friedman participated actively in preparing Schultz’s 1935 article and in the cor-
responding eighteenth chapter of Schultz 1938 (cf. Chipman and Lenfant 2002). In The Theory 
and Measurement of Demand, Schultz (1938, chaps. 18, 19) would carefully compare the rela-
tive merits of each definition. Comparing the Johnson-Allen-Friedman preference-based defini-
tions of complementarity with the Slutsky-Hicks-Allen-Schultz (SHAS) definition, he also reas-
sessed the advantages of the “special” theory of related demands (based on the constant 
marginal utility of money hypothesis) over the more complicated “general” theory of related 
demands. The main reason for not retaining the Johnson-Allen-Friedman definitions is that the 
conditions for statistical applications are too remote because the relation between goods is 
defined over the whole indifference map and thus necessitates having an estimate of demands 
on the whole choice set (Schultz 1938, 612). Another weakness for statistical economics is that 
the relation between goods is supposed to be the same whatever the combination of goods (614; 
see also page 619 for a comment on Friedman’s definition). On the contrary, the SHAS defini-
tion, as it is constructed on the basis of Slutsky’s compensating variations, depends on market 
conditions (income and relative prices) and can be obtained from statistical information (subject 
to restrictions on aggregation). Thus choice theory provides “quantitatively definite relations” 
from which it is possible “to test the agreement between theory and facts” (Schultz 1938, 646).
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It is probable that the income effect is also small for most articles of 
wide consumption on which only a small proportion of the income is 
spent. We may, therefore, expect the simpler Hotelling conditions to be 
satisfied by a large number of demand phenomena. But this supposi-
tion needs to be fortified by more extensive statistical investigations. 
(Schultz 1938, 646)
Despite the mitigated success of Schultz’s endeavor at this stage, it still 
had an effect on the theory of choice. Schultz’s influence will be percep-
tible through the synthesis of the theory of demand by Hicks, once he 
came back to the subject after his collaboration with Allen.
Constructing the Hicks-Slutsky Theory  
of Demand and Complementarity and  
Reconsidering the Marshallian Orthodoxy
What still needs to be recounted is to what extent and how the Schultz-
Slutsky and Hicks-Allen reconstructions of demand theory were eventu-
ally synthesized as the Hicks-Slutsky theory of demand in Hicks’s Value 
and Capital and subsequently in most standard textbooks.
We have seen that Schultz preferred to construct his analysis of 
demand on Slutsky’s equations because they were more adapted to sta-
tistical handling. He had first expressed his disappointment about the 
bad results obtained from testing the Hotelling and Slutsky symmetry 
conditions, imputing the fault not to the model but to the weakness of 
statistical tools (Schultz 1935, 472). It is nevertheless quite striking that 
Schultz came to consider that income effects were so small as to block 
any effort to test Slutsky symmetry conditions. 
This development of the econometrics of demand was not without 
influence on Hicks, and it is certainly the major incentive toward the 
synthesis of demand theory that was exposed in Value and Capital. 
Already in his 1937 booklet, Hicks had exposed demand theory on the 
basis of Slutsky’s equation; later in Value and Capital, he would mix 
both presentations.47 Hicks also enlarged the definition in the n-good 
case through introducing a composite commodity (“money”) whose 
relative prices are constants, so that the presentation fits with the usual 
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47. The literal and geometrical representation in the full text is in the Hicksian manner, 
whereas the analytic presentation in the appendix follows Slutsky’s compensation (Hicks 
1939, 309). Later Jacob Mosak (1942) showed that the Slutsky and Hicks decompositions are 
equivalent for infinitesimal price variations.
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presentation in a three-good framework: two goods and “money.”48 Hence 
the definition of complementarity is now expressed in this way:49
Suppose that Y (one of the other commodities) is complementary with 
X—according to our definition of complementarity. Then we know 
that if the amount of Y is held constant, a substitution in favour of X 
and against money (now other goods than X or Y) will raise the mar-
ginal rate of substitution of Y for money. Now the price of Y in terms 
of money is given and constant; so a rise in the marginal rate of sub-
stitution of Y for money must encourage a substitution of Y for money, 
if the marginal rate of substitution of Y for money is to be kept equal 
to the price of Y. Therefore, if Y is complementary with X, a substitu-
tion of Y for money tends to be accompanied by a parallel substitution 
of Y for money. The substitution in favour of X stimulates a similar 
substitution in favour of Y. On the other hand, if, on our definition, Y 
is a substitute for X, a substitution of X for money (Y constant) encour-
ages a substitution in favour of money and against Y. The substitution 
in favour of X tends to be accompanied by a substitution against Y. It 
is our definition of complementarity which draws the exact line 
between these two situations. (Hicks 1939, 46)
As Samuelson (1950, 379) later remarked, Hicks’s introduction of money 
was definitely putting the Hicks and Allen theory at the same level of gen-
erality with the Schultz-Slutsky presentation, thus inaugurating the now-
standard Hicks-Slutsky theory of demand:
In 1939, Hicks seems to have abandoned this definition in favour of the 
Slutsky-Schultz definitions; for n = 3, the results of either definition are 
qualitatively the same. For n > 3, this is not true. If we define all but 
the two goods in question to be a Hicksian composite commodity, then 
the Slutsky-Hicks definition can be cast in Hicks-Allen terminology.
Another probable instance of Schultz’s influence on Hicks, although it 
must be advanced cautiously, is that the income effects are so negligible 
that it is best to work with Hotelling’s symmetry conditions. Although 
Hicks advocated a general theory of value, he did not intend to repudiate 
Marshallian simplifications at all. Regarding the Marshallian theory of 
demand, Hicks went on to confess in Value and Capital that “further 
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48. “So long as the prices of other consumption goods are assumed to be given, they can 
be lumped together into one commodity ‘money’ or ‘purchasing power in general’” (Hicks 
1939, 33).
49. For a geometrical representation, see Hayek 1943 and Samuelson 1974.
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investigation has only increased my admiration for Marshall’s theory; I 
hope the reader will find the same” (11). Regarding the constant mar-
ginal utility of money assumption, Hicks wants to show, through the 
general formulation of the law of demand, that Marshall had just made 
“an ingenious simplification” and had “quite good reasons” for doing so 
(27). And now that economists do have a general theory of demand, they 
can indulge in Marshallian simplification, in full knowledge of what 
they are neglecting (32–33). In some respects, Hicks’s justification for 
preserving the law of demand is based on the idea that in most economic 
situations, income effects are small enough compared with substitution 
effects, which is tantamount to Schultz’s statistical estimations. In other 
respects, Hicks is more cautious than Schultz and would not regard those 
results as a litmus test in favor of the law of demand. For instance, Hicks’s 
statement about the law of demand is based also on considerations on gen-
eral equilibrium, aggregation on goods and individuals, whereas Schultz 
does not consider carefully the many intrinsic limits of his model (regard-
ing exogenous income or linear demand functions).
Theoretical considerations apart, it is quite probable that Hicks’s ear-
lier intuitions on income effects must have been reinforced by Schultz’s 
comments. As Hicks later confessed on many occasions, the reconstruc-
tion of demand theory was clearly driven by the development of econo-
metrics. Hicks (1956b, vi, vii) claimed, in the introduction to the French 
translation of Value and Capital, that “economic theory must be the 
servant to applied economics” and also that “the first part [of Value and 
Capital], which deals with demand theory, was inspired by the work of 
old econometricians, especially the articles from Henry Schultz.” And 
in A Revision of Demand Theory, he again acknowledged that in Value 
and Capital “at crucial points the argument was put in a form which was 
influenced by what the econometrists had been doing,” and he also 
asserted that the end of the story inaugurated by Pareto and followed by 
Slutsky, Johnson, Hicks, and others was to make “the Pareto theory 
more usable and . . . [to weave] the Marshallian and Paretian threads 
together” (Hicks 1956a, 3).50 The econometric concern, if not the sole 
concern, was quite clear, as Hicks (1981, xii) puts it:
It was not explained, in the Hicks-Allen paper, what prompted us to 
make our enquiry. It began in fact from econometrics. It was the work 
of Henry Schultz, on statistical demand study, which set us off. What 
80 History of Political Economy 38:5 (2006)
50. This is perfectly compatible with the fact that Hicks (1979, 202) was always dubitative 
toward econometrics.
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we were doing was to reformulate demand theory so as to put it into a 
form which would be more usable by econometrists. 
Thus it is not to be doubted that there were cross-influences between 
Schultz on the one side and Hicks on the other. Was this of any influence 
on econometrics and economic theory at the time? At least two strands 
of work can be seen as a good testimony for the solid implantation of the 
Hicks-Slutsky synthesis in price theory. First, Hicks and Allen’s article 
influenced econometrists and their offspring in the late 1930s, espe-
cially, although not only, at the Cowles Commission (Hands and Mirow-
ski 1998, 374). Gerhard Tintner’s (1938) theory of dynamical demand 
curves is an extension of Hicks and Allen; Jacob Marschak (1943) refers 
to Hicks and Allen to estimate individual demand functions; Jacob 
Mosak (1938) provides an extension to the demand of productive services; 
and E. E. Lewis (not at Cowles), through a series of articles on intercom-
modity relationships (1937, 1938a, 1938b), is still another example of work 
done under the guidance of Hicks, Allen, and Schultz. Second, the whole 
development of general equilibrium, at least until the 1950s, is centered 
on discussing income and price effects, aggregation, and above all sta-
bility, always with Value and Capital as a reference. But this is another 
story.51
4. Conclusion
A first conclusion deals with the idea of a stabilization of demand theory 
around the Hicks-Slutsky synthesis. My claim in this article is that the 
development of a modern theory of demand in the 1930s was not exclu-
sively motivated by the use of an index utility function but that it was 
motivated also by the need to define the concept of complementarity and 
to give to it a definition adapted to the construction of a theory of choice. 
To that extent, the most important result of the Hicks-Allen definition is 
not the Hicksian decomposition itself; rather, it is the use of this decompo-
sition to study both the law of demand and the law of related demands. 
This result has been made possible only through a complete transforma-
tion of the concept: its meaning and its analytic definition have been 
changed drastically. Notably, after Hicks and Allen 1934 it is no longer 
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51. My narrative is stopping at a time when divergent approaches would challenge the 
Hicks-Slutsky presentation of demand. But challengers do not hesitate to take the Hicks-
Slutsky theory as their main target (Knight 1944; Friedman 1949; Samuelson 1938a, 1938b) 
(although for different reasons and with divergent aims).
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possible to interpret complementarity as a binary relationship between 
two goods (and an individual) taken apart from the context of choice. On 
the contrary, the context of choice is a constituting part of the definition.
A second conclusion is about the progressive transformation of the con-
cept. At both extremes—the introspective properties and the operational 
properties—one may feel that complementarity was quite evidently and 
naturally transformed by the ordinalist principles. Things are not so sim-
ple. From all those debates, it is clear that the properties of the concept are 
as important at the end of the story as at the beginning.52 The road taken 
to develop a new concept is not straightforward or reducible to a technical 
challenge. It is rather the product of many constraints: on testability, on 
the operational aspects of economic concepts, on intuitive properties of 
complementarity, on homogeneity of definitions. For instance, is it neces-
sary that one should tell if two goods are completing or competing in any 
circumstances or just in given economic circumstances? Shall we impose 
a priori that completing goods are as likely to occur as competing ones? 
What should be the heuristic behind the concept? Shall we privilege 
homogeneous definitions of all types of relations, or shall we accept, for 
instance, to define independence in a peculiar way or to refer to different 
types of complementarities or competitiveness? Shall we privilege con-
cepts that are appropriate for statistical handling, or shall we rather search 
for definitions that fit some intuitive (or subjective, or introspective) rep-
resentations? All those questions have been addressed here and there, 
and the answers have never been dictated by one single a priori principle 
to demarcate ordinalism and cardinalism. Quite the contrary, answers 
depended on many different constraints and ideas about what should be 
a good concept of complementarity.
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